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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SELANIE SANONE, by and 
through her Guardian Ad Litem, 
JOHN G. SANONE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, a 
corporation, WESTINGHOUSE 
ELECTRIC CORPORATION, a 
corporation, and ELEVATOR 
SERVICE & SUPPLY COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 10047 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND O·F CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries to Selanie San-
one, a minor, occurring on the escalator in the defendant 
J. C. Penney Store located at 213 South Main Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant J. C. Penney Company was granted 
leave to make Westinghouse Electric Corporation and 
Elevator Service & Supply Company, a corporation, parties 
to this action. After service of summons and the third 
party complaint alleging negligence and an amendment 
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2 
thereto alleging breach of contract, the Court, upon mo-
tion, dismissed the third party's complaint as amended 
without prejudice. Thereafter plaintiff amended her com-
plaint, joining Westinghouse Electric Corporation and 
Elevator Service & Supply Company as defendants. The 
Court dismissed the defendant Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation with prejudice and denied defendant Elevator 
Service & Supply Company's motion to dismiss. Pursuant 
to a covenant not to sue, the defendant Elevator Service 
& Supply Company paid the plaintiff $7,000.00, which 
settlement was approved by the Court. The case was tried 
to a jury. From the verdict and judgment for the plaintiff 
in the sum of $12,500.00, the defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant J. C. Penney Company seeks a reversal of 
the judgment and judgment in its favor as a matter of 
law, and that failing, a reversal of the Court's ruling dis-
missing its third party complaint against Elevator Service 
& Supply Company. 
STATEMENT· OF FACTS 
On June 29, 1961, Mrs. John G. Sanone brought her 
two and one-half year old daughter, Selanie, the plaintiff 
in this case, to Salt Lake City. They were accompanied by 
Mrs. Sanone's best girl friend, Mrs. David A. Goodwill, 
and her minor child. They were going to do some shopping 
and take the two children to lunch. They arrived in down-
town Salt Lake City at approximately 11:00 A.M., and 
went first to Auerbach's. (R 209-210) They shopped in 
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Auerbach's, where Mrs. Sanone allowed the little girl to 
ride the escalator. (R 219) They walked from Auerbach's 
to J. C. Penney's, where they shopped on the main floor 
for about fifteen or twenty minutes, and then she went 
upstairs to the second floor blouse department, riding the 
esc ala tor and carrying Selanie. They shopped another 
fifteen or twenty minutes until about noon, or a little 
after, and then decided to go downstairs. Selanie asked her 
mother if she could ride the escalator, and Mrs. Sanone 
said, uYes", put her down, and took hold of her hand. 
They were then about ten feet from the escalator, and 
Mrs. Sanone was holding Selanie's right hand with her 
left hand. When she got to the escalator she tells what 
happened: 
uA. I waited for a step to come and had hold of 
her hand and walked up to the edge and watched 
her step on, and we stepped on together and started 
down. 
Q. After you stepped on together, were you still 
holding on to her hand? 
A. Oh yes. I had quite a tight hold on it because 
-helping her to step on. 
Q. And where were you looking after you got on 
the escalator? 
A. I looked down as we got on and took hold of 
the hand and looked straight ahead. 
Q. And while you were proceeding down the 
escalator, tell the court and jury what happened. 
A. Well, we had just barely started out, and we 
were just standing there riding down, and all of a 
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sudden I felt her pulling down on my hand I 
thought, and just then she sobbed out, uMommie, 
my foot is caught," and I glanced down, and I 
couldn't see her leg. I could just see the escalator 
opening up, and I thought her shoe was caught, so 
I ripped up, pulling her out. Sorry. 
Q. And at the time when you pulled her out, Mrs. 
Sanone, did she scream? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then what did you do? 
A. I didn't-still didn't know what had happened, 
and she was sort of standing on one foot. It was 
all so fast, and I just picked her up into my arms, 
and then I saw her leg." (R 212-213) 
On cross-examination, Mrs. Sanone testified that she 
did not have any concern in her mind about letting Selanie 
ride an escalator, nor did she expect any warning sign. 
(R 219) She couldn't see Selanie's leg when she screamed 
because of Selanie's two slips and dress. (R 219) 
Q. Now, you are acquainted with the fact that 
there are many escalators in Salt Lake City? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And would it be fair to say that you have 
probably ridden all of them? 
A. Probably. 
Q. Would it also be fair to say that you have taken 
the little girl on the escalators before in other 
stores? 
A. Occasionally. 
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Q. Also in J. C. Penney's before, haven't you? 
A. I think so. 
Q. You have shopped there many times? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you have an estimate of how many? 
A. She was-oh, I wouldn't say more than two 
times. I didn't usually go up there because of the 
walking. We usually just shopped at Auerbach's. 
Q. Did you-had you had the little girl on that 
particular escalator before? 
A. I don't recall any time I ever had. 
Q. You could have, couldn't you? 
A. I could have, yes. 
Q. You had no difficulty previous to this time? 
A. No." (R 221-222) 
They had been walking around prior to the time the 
accident occurred, and she had carried Selanie, or they 
had walked together and held hands. The weather was 
warm on June 29th, but she had not noticed whether the 
child's leg had perspired or not. (R 223) 
It was approximately 12:30 o'clock p.m. when the 
accident happened, and Mrs. Sanone ran to the bottom 
of the escalator screaming for an ambulance, and then 
went to the L. D. S. Hospital. Selanie had a cut on the 
outside of her left leg which ran about from the front 
of the calf down the leg across and in front of the leg 
to the front side just above the ankle. (R 22 8) 
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Right after, at 1 :00 o'clock p.m., in response to a call 
from J. C. Penney Company, Mr. Golden E. Hansen, an 
employee of the Elevator Service & Supply Company, 
went to the J. C. Penney store. Mr. Hansen was acquainted 
with the operation, inspection, and maintenance by his 
company, Elevator Service & Supply Company, of the 
J. C. Penney store, and in particular, the esc ala tors. These 
escalators are inspected and maintenance work done every 
Monday morning. (R 280) When he arrived the escalator 
was shut down and he measured every step with his ruler 
on both sides; he took a flashlight and measured and ran 
the steps around and measured them again. There was no 
more clearance than three sixteenths of an inch. He 
reported to the store that there was no error in clearance 
on the escalator and told them to go ahead and run it 
again. (R 280-281) 
If a variance in the measurement and clearance in the 
side panel up to three eighths of an inch were found, that 
would have been reported to the company. On July 10, Mr. 
Hansen and four or five men adjusted the particular esca-
lator. (R 285-286) Mr. Hansen never made a recom-
mendation to anybody that his company go back and do 
the work. When one stands at the bottom or walks up the 
escalator or walks down it or moves with it, one can not 
see three sixteenths of an inch. (R 287-288) 
Mr. William L. Collins, the State Elevator Inspector 
for Industrial Commission of Utah, made an inspection 
of the escalator on July 6, 1961. (R 255-256) The Ameri-
can Standard Safety Code for Elevators, Dumb Waiters, 
and Escalators, 1960 edition, published by the American 
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Society of Mechanical Engineers is followed by Mr. Collins, 
and Section 802.3c reads as follows: 
* * * "802.3c Clearance Between Balustrades and 
Steps. The clearance on either side of the steps be-
tween the steps and the adjacent skirt guard shall 
be not more than three sixteenths inch, and the 
sum of the clearance on both sides shall be not 
more than one quarter inch." (R 259 and Ex. P-5) 
Mr. Collins made his inspection with a ruler in three 
or four places. (R 259-260) He found the escalator to be 
within three eighths of an inch to three sixteenths of an 
inch. This varied in between up and down the full length 
of the escalator and on both sides. He made a recommenda-
tion that the clearance be reduced to the code-required 
maximum. The measurement on the south side of the 
escalator was not over three sixteenths of an inch and it 
could have been less but not more. He used a Lufkin ruler 
and the clearance on the north side varied only as much as 
the thickness of the rule marking. This variance comes over 
a period of years or wearing. (R 268-269) The clearance 
present is effected by people bumping the skirts or ob-
jects getting caught in the side, or there are several things 
that can effect the clearance and it is a gradual matter. 
(R 260-261) There are four escalators in the J. C. Penney 
store, and Mr. Collins examined all of them. He made 
regular inspections of all escalators. A special amount of 
skill and knowledge is required for the installation, repair 
and maintenance of escalators customarily, by elevator 
service companies employed and hired by the stores to 
maintain regular inspections. (R 270-271) 
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The court took defendant's motions for dismissal at 
the close of the plaintiff's case under advisement. (R 273) 
Mr. Harold G. Smith, Manager of the J. C. Penney 
store, testified that the store has a regular contractual re-
lationship with Elevator Service & Supply Company for 
repair, maintenance and inspection of the escalators. The 
contract provides for an inspection, repair and mainte-
nance over-all once a week. A voucher is sent in weekly 
when the work is completed, and J. C. Penney Company 
relied entirely upon Elevator Service & Supply Company 
for recommendations, repair and maintenance. (R 273-
277) 
A lubricant is used on the vertical side of the escala-
tor adjacent to the steps to make it slick, not so that a 
person's leg or part of their body might slide along instead 
of being caught in it. (R 278) This is to give it a slipping 
motion rather than a grab. (R 262) The lubricant used is 
({Slip It", and had been put on that escalator in connection 
with the every Monday morning service. (R 282) 
The court took the motion of the defendant J. C. 
Penney Company for a directed verdict under advisement. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE JURY FO~UND IN FAVO'R OF THE DE-
FENDANT ON THE ISSUE OF THE EXISTENCE OF 
ANY DEFECT WHICH MIGHT HAVE CONSTI-
TUTED NEGLIGENCE AND THE COURT ERRED 
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IN ALLOWING THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR TO APPLY. 
The Court gave a Special Verdict to the jury in ad-
dition to the General Instructions. Instruction Number 14 
of the General Instructions was Instruction Number 17.30 
taken from Jury Instruction Forms for Utah entitled, 
ceRes Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine Defined," except for one 
material difference. The court instructed the jury as fol-
lows: 
uNo 14. Our law recognizes the doctrine 
known as res ipsa loquitur, which means the thing 
speaks for itself. By reason of it, under certain 
circumstances, one who is injured may hold another 
person responsible without showing the exact con-
duct of the other party. The doctrine of law may be 
applied only under special circumstances, they 
being as follows: 
First, that some instrumentality which proxi-
mately caused injury to the plaintiff was in the 
possession of and under the exclusive control of the 
defendant at the time and cause of injury was set in 
motion and that it appears that the injury resulted 
from some act or omission incident to the defend-
ant's management of such instrumentality. 
Second, that the incident was one of such a 
nature as does not happen in the ordinary course 
of things if those who have control of the instru-
ment use ordinary care. 
Gentlemen, come here just a minute, will you. 
(Court and counsel confer at the bench) . 
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THE COURT: I will have to correct that last 
sentence and say second, that the incident was one 
of such a nature as does not happen in the ordinary 
course of things if those who have control of the 
instrument use the highest degree of care. 
Third, that the circumstances surrounding the 
causing of the occurrence were such that plaintiff 
is not in a position to know what specific conduct 
was the cause, whereas the defendant may reason-
ably be expected to know and be able to explain 
the cause of the incident. 
If you find all of the above conditions to exist, 
they give rise to an inference that the defendant was 
negligent, which inference will support a verdict 
for the plaintiff in the absence of any showing that 
offsets such inference." (R 300-301) 
The requirement placed upon the defendant to use the 
highest degree of care immediately differentiates this case 
from the usual res ipsa loquitur case. The court then fol-
lowed all of the General Instructions, with the Special 
Verdict, and instructed the jurors as follows: 
((Gentlemen of the Jury, the answers to the 
following questions are in dispute. You are directed 
to answer each question if you can do so by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence in this case. If you find 
the evidence on any proposition to be so evenly 
balanced that you are unable to say by a preponder-
ance of the evidence what the true answer is, then 
you should write for your answer the phrase (No 
preponderance.' "(R 303) 
This directive in the manner in which to answer the 
questions was somewhat unusual, but in accordance with 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II 
the court's directive, the jury answered question No. 2 
relating to specific negligence of the defendant as alleged 
by the plaintiff, by writing uNo preponderance" and this 
question was signed by all of the jurors without exception. 
That question read: 
"Question No. 2: Immediately prior to the time 
when Selanie Sanone was injured, was the escalator 
in the defendant's store being operated with a clear-
ance between the moving steps and the skirt on one 
side of a greater width than 3/16 of an inch or with 
a combined clearance on both sides of a distance 
greater than I/ 4 inch between the moving steps and 
the two skirts? Answer. Those jurors agreeing 
please sign." (R 304) 
Thereafter, the court submitted Questions Number 
5 and 6, which read as follows: 
"Question No. S: Was the accident and injury sus-
tained by plaintiff of such a nature that it would 
not ordinarily have occurred in the absence of 
negligence on the part of defendant? Answer. 
Those jurors agreeing please sign. 
Question No. 6: Has the defendant explained the 
happening of the accident so as to avoid the in-
ference, if any, of negligence under the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur? Answer. Those jurors agreeing 
please sign." ( R 3 04) 
Seven jurors answered Question NumberS uNo", and 
all eight jurors answered Question Number 6 ((No". Of 
great importance in this case is the discussion by the court 
regarding this Special Verdict after the jury had returned. 
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tcTHE COURT: Mr. Upchurch, have all of 
the questions now been answered by the jurors? 
MR. UPCHURCH: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And have you signed at the 
bottom as the Foreman? 
MR. UPCHURCH: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Let the sheriff pass it to me, 
please. 
(Special verdict given to the Court.) 
THE CO~UR T: Gentlemen, I will read the 
questions to you. 
((Question No. 1 : As shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in this case, what amount of 
money would fairly and adequately recompense 
Selanie Sanone for any and all injury and damage 
which she sustained as a result of the injury re-
ceived while riding on defendant's escalator?" 
The answer is tc $12, S 0 0 ", and that is signed by 
all eight jurors. 
{(Question No. 2: Immediately prior to the 
time when Selanie Sanone was injured, was the esca-
lator in the defendant's store being operated with a 
clearance between the moving steps and the skirt on 
one side of a greater width than 3/16 of an inch 
or with a combined clearance on both sides of a 
distance greater than 1 I 4 inch between the moving 
steps and the two skirts?" 
Gentlemen, you haven't signed the answer. 
You don't write uNo preponderance" if you are 
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not in agreement that the evidence does not pre-
ponderate. If you are unable to agree on the answer, 
don't put that in. If some of you think it was and 
some wasn't, you are not agreed that the evidence 
does not preponderate. One thinks it preponder-
ates one way, and one thinks another, so if-I am 
not sure by this answer. If you are all of the opinion 
or if six of you are of the opinion that this evidence 
just doesn't warrant you in finding one way or 
the other, then those who agree with that ought to 
sign. None of you have signed. Can you take care 
of it in the jury box, or do you need to retire on 
this? 
MR. UPCHURCH: No, sir, I think we can 
take care of it here. 
THE COURT: Sheriff, would you pass it 
back to the foreman. Do you need something to 
put that on to write with? 
(Jurors sign special verdict) . 
THE COURT: The answer to question No. 
2 as read was that there was no preponderance of 
the evidence one way or the other. That is signed 
by Vernon L. Upchurch, Mark C. Wheeler, Go-
thard Johnson, John Fife, Roy Jensen, Clarence 
Lemmon, D. V. Anderson, and J. W. Dunstone. 
((Question No. 3: If so"- and they say ((No 
preponderance," so you wouldn't really need to an-
swer Question No. 3 because you say you couldn't 
answer that. If you answer it, if you did find 
that it was greater than 3/16, then you should have 
answered 3 and 4, but 3 and 4 answers can be 
ignored because it wasn't so that it is more than 
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3/16 of an inch. You weren't able to say it was, so 
you don't need to tell me about the rest of it. 
ccQuestion No. 5: Was the accident and injury 
sustained by plaintiff of such nature that it would 
not ordinarily have. occurred in the absence of 
negligence on the part of defendant?" The answer 
is uNo," this was not such an injury that would 
not have occurred except in the absence of negli-
gence. That is signed seven, seven jurors. Let's see. 
Who didn't sign that? Yes. Mr. Wheeler. You did 
not agree that this was such an accident that would 
not have happened except in the case of negligence 
[sic]. You thought there ought to be some negli-
gence for this to happen. All right. 
((Question No. 6: Has the defendant explained 
the happening of the accident so as to avoid the 
inference, if any, of negligence under the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur?" The answer is ((No," he hasn't 
explained it, but you <L.dn,t find there was any 
negligence there. You didn't say that this would 
have happened except for negligence, and so by 
saying he hasn't explained it, he does not have to 
explain it unless there was negligence. This answer 
of (tN o" is signed by all eight jurors, and the verdict 
is signed by the foreman. 
Now, Gentlemen, if this was your verdict as 
I have read it and if it is still your verdict, I want 
you to show by the raising of your hand as to Ques-
tion No. I, the amount of damages which this little 
girl sustained was $12,500. If that was your verdict 
when you left your room and is now your verdict, 
please raise your hand. All hands are up. 
As to Question No. 2, ccimmediately prior to 
the time when Selanie Sanone was injured, was the 
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escalator in the defendant's store being operated 
with a clearance between the moving steps and the 
skirt on one stde of a greater width than 3 I 16 of 
an inch or with a combined clearance on both sides 
of a distance greater than II 4 inch between the 
moving steps and the two skirts," if you are unable 
to say from this evidence whether that is true or not 
true, raise your hand, those who say that they were 
unable to say. I don't see all the hands up. That is 
what you said by this verdict. You have written 
uNo preponderance" and have signed it. You can 
write uNo preponderance" only in case you are 
unable to say whether that space was more than 
3 I 16 or not more than 3 I 16 on one side or more 
than a quarter on both sides or not more than 
a quarter. If you are unable to say, if that is still 
vour verdict, please raise your hand. That's all 
hands but one. Mr. Anderson, your hand is not up 
on that, I take it. 
MR. ANDERSON: Yes, sir. 
THE CO·UR T: It was up by the side of your 
ear. I don't know whether you were scratching 
your head. All hands are then up on this. 
The other 3 and 4 wouldn't be needed to 
answer since we don't know whether it was more 
or less than the lawful distance. 
As to 5, your verdict tells me that this acci-
dent was of such a nature that- was the accident 
and iniury of such a nature that it wonld not ordi-
narilv 'have occurred in the absence of ne~ligence. 
This wasn't verv artfullv drawn. hnt '"nn have s:1id. 
· uNo." Bv that answer vonr verdiC"t tellc; me that 
this accident was the tvoe that co,l<l h::1.vP n("r,rrPd 
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without any negligence being present. If that was 
your verdict when you left the jury room and is 
your verdict now, raise your hand. 
MR. UPCHURCH: May I say something? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. UPCHURCH: We had a little misunder-
standing on that. 
THE CO,URT: It isn't too clear. 
MR. UPCHURCH: It was a little-
THE COURT: Let me explain, and you may 
then tell me if you want to discuss this or change 
your verdict. If this a,ccident was the kind that 
could have occurred without any negligence, you 
would write rrN o." If this accident is the kind that 
would not have occurred except for negligence, you 
ought to write rry es" because that is what my ques-
tion was, was the accident of such a nature that 
it would not have occurred unless there was negli-
gence. 
MR. WHEELER: It also states uabsence of 
negligence." 
THE CO,URT: If it would not have occurred 
-was the accident and injury sustained of such a 
nature that it would not ordinarily have occurred 
in the absence of negligence?" No, it would not 
have occurred in the absence of negligence. All 
right, I was the one that was in error, and you gave 
more careful thought to that than I did. If your 
verdict then is that this accident was the type that 
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would not have occurred except for negligence, 
that is, it would not have occurred unless there was 
some negligence not known by us but known to the 
defendant, if it was the type of an injury that 
would not have occurred except there be some kind 
of negligence, raise your hand if that is your ver-
dict. That is everybody's except one. That is Mr. 
Wheeler. All right. 
Then uHas the defendant explained the hap-
pening of the accident so as to avoid the inference, 
if any, of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur?" The answer is uNo." That is signed by 
everybody. If that is still your verdict that this de-
fendant has not explained to you how this matter 
occurred, raise your hand if that is still your ver-
dict. That's everybody's hand. (Emphasis added) 
Well, that changes the situation a little bit." 
(R 312-317) 
The foregoing procedures and the results reached 
were so unusual that it is difficult to determine just what 
the jury did or did not understand and what they meant 
by their verdict. It is submitted that the conclusion could 
be reached that the jury in effect intended to return a 
verdict in favor of the defendant on the issue of Res Ipsa 
Loquitur as it did return a verdict in favor of the defend-
ant on the alleged grounds of negligence. Certainly it is 
apparent that the court erred in allowing the Doctrine of 
Res Ipsa Loquitur to support a verdict where the jury 
found that no alleged defect existed which could have con-
stituted negligence and where the defendant was charged 
with the highest degree of care. 
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In giving Special Verdict question No. 5, the court 
failed to include the necessary elements in that question 
which were contained in instruction No. 14. Question No. 
5 taken alone was misleading and inadequate and did not 
properly question the jury as to an inference of negligence, 
exclusive control of the escalator, or whether they knew 
or should have known of any possible defect existing. To 
illustrate the particular elements in the rule of Res Ipsa 
Loquitur we shall discuss each of them in sequence here-
after. 
1. 
EVEN ASSUMING EXCLUSIVE CONTROL BY 
THE DEFENDANT IT WOULD NOT APPEAR 
THAT THE INJURY RESULTED FROM SOME ACT 
OR OMISSION INCIDENT TO THE DEFENDANT'S 
MANAGEMENT OF THE ESCALATOR. 
It is important in this case to note the relatively mi-
nute clearance tolerance here, according to Mr. Collins, 
((varying only as much as the thickness of the rule mark-
ing." (R 268-269) The word uminute" is most appropri-
ate, for if the individual widths of the first four letters of 
that particular word are measured with a ruler the follow-
ing approximate measurements will appear: The letter urn" 
is 1/8 inch wide; each of the letters un" and uu" is 1/16 
inch wide; all three letters umin" measured together are 
1/4 inch wide. During the examination of Mr. Collins the 
court recognized this relatively minute clearance when 
he was being asked to draw such on a plain piece of paper. 
MR. AADNESEN: I am using it for illustra-
tive purposes, Your Honor, to show the width as 
such as it would actually appear. I believe I am en-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
titled to do that. I will let him draw then if you 
will, put your dots right on here-put it here-
THE COURT: Well, that pencil is-
MR. AADNESEN: I'm not going to ask him 
to do it with that. 
THE COURT: If you had a fine pen point, 
I think you could start maybe giving distances, 
but a point as thick as the pen you are holding in 
your hand couldn't possibly give any help to the 
jury. They know what three eighths of an inch is, 
and I don't know that we can explain it to them 
any better. (R 267) 
The testimony of Mr. Hansen, the repair and main-
tenance man for Elevator Service & Supply Company, is 
singularly positive in regard to the clearance measure-
ments, and by their answers to Special Verdict question 
No. 2, the jury must have believed him. He made his in-
spection within an hour after the accident occurred. 
HQ Other than that. On the day of the 29th 
of June, 19 61, were you called over to the J. C. 
Penney store? 
A Yes. 
Q About what time? 
A It was right after one o'clock when I got 
there. 
Q I see. Did you go in response to a call from 
]. C. Penney's? 
A Yes. 
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Q All right. What did you do when you ar-
rived? 
A The escalator was shut down, and I went 
up and measured every step with my ruler on both 
sides, took a flashlight and measured and run the 
steps around and measured it again to see that there 
was no more clearance than three sixteenths. 
Q That there was no more clearance than the 
three sixteenths? 
A No. 
Q And that was on June 29-
A June 29. 
Q -1961, right after the accident? 
A Yes. 
Q I see. Did you go back subsequently and 
do any work on that? 
A No, not that I know of. 
Q Did you report to the store? 
A Yes. 
Q And it was your report, was it not, that 
there was no error in clearance on that elevator? 
A Yes. 
Q Escalator? 
A Yes." (R 280-281) 
From all the foregoing and from the jury's determina-
tion in favor of the defendant on that question it cannot 
be said that the injury resulted from some act or omis-
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sion incident to the defendant's management of the esca-
lator. In this case we are not considering the ((barrel of 
flour," "lump of coal," ((loose bathtub leg" or ((falling 
plaster" cases. The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur may be 
applied in such cases where a defect is actually found or 
circumstances and conditions existed which did cause the 
injury, thus furnishing a basis for an inference. In our 
case the jury specifically found that no defect of any 
kind or nature existed which could have caused the injury 
and no inference may arise where such would be tanta-
mount to pure speculation as to the possible cause of the 
InJury. 
In this regard we respectfully point out to the court 
that injury can occur without negligence such as where 
a person alights from a streetcar or where a passenger on 
a train arrives in Salt Lake City with frozen feet. The 
mere occurrence of an accident alone without the neces-
sary elements of the Res Ipsa Loquitur rule is never suf-
ficient to establish a Res Ipsa Loquitur case since it creates 
no reasonable inference that anyone, let alone the de-
fendant, has been negligent. See Morrissey v. Union Pac. 
R. Co., 68 Utah 323, 329, 249 Pac. 1064, 1066 (1926); 
Wells v. Utah Construction Co., 27 Utah 524, 525, 76 Pac. 
560 ( 1904); Zoccolillo v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 53 
Utah 39, 177 Pac. 201 (1918); Paul v. Salt Lake City R. 
Co., 34 Utah 1, 95 Pac. 363 (1908). It is only when an in-
jury does not ordinarily happen unless someone has been ne-
gligent and where the circumstances are inconsistent with 
any other theory that an inference of negligence is justi-
fied. White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 495, 108 P. 2d. 249, 
254 (1940). As stated in ((The Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine 
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in Utah", 3 Utah Law Review No. 1, 113, 114: ulf, 
however, the circumstances of the accident causing injury 
are equally sufficient with a cause which would not be 
attributable to negligence, the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Lo-
quitur does not apply." See Jenson v. S. H. Kress & Co., 
87 Utah 434, 438, 49 P. 2d 958, 960 (1935). 
It is within the common knowledge of this court 
that bare flesh against a moving metal surface and braced 
or stationary against an adjacent surface can and may 
well result in a pinching or tearing of the skin and flesh. 
It is doubtful that any person would find it necessary to 
actually test the accuracy of the foregoing statement and 
particularly where an escalator is involved. To illustrate, 
some pinching would be expected to result if one were to 
place the flat of one's hand against the skirt or stationary 
part of the escalator with the lateral surface of the hand 
against the riser or step of a moving escalator. This would 
be even more graphically illustrated if the more tender 
flesh of the leg were applied in the same manner. Should 
any part of the body so exposed receive injury as a result 
of this test, the cause could not be said to have been due 
to an act or omission on the part of the owner of the 
escalator sufficient to create an inference of negligence. 
This court can in like' manner take judicial knowledge of 
the fact that thousands of people ride escalators in Salt 
Lake City daily, and that the accident which occurred in 
this particular case is not one that would not have occurred 
except for negligence on the part of the defendant. There 
is no code or regulation requiring any warning signs or 
prohibiting children of the tender age of two and one-half 
years from riding on the escalator and, particularly, stand-
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ing on the steps. It is obvious that a child of such age could 
not read such a sign nor heed any warning, and the parents 
of such a child can judge the safety and circumstances on 
the same basis and with the same knowledge that the owner 
of the escalator could. 
The discussion found in The Res Ipsa Loquitur Doc-
trine in Utah," supra, beginning at page 119 is most 
appropriate here and merits the court's attention. 
uThus the possibility suggests itself that these 
cases, involving the liability of a carrier, which 
state the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to place the 
burden of proof upon the defendant, have con-
fused the effect of the doctrine with the rule re-
lating to the special duty of the carrier. There is 
a strong likelihood that in such an intermingling 
lies the explanation for the origin of the shift-of-
burden-of-proof rule sometimes applied in res ipsa 
loquitur cases. But be this as it may, it is apparent 
from the later decisions of the Utah court that any 
concept which may once have been entertained as 
to the shifting of the burden of proof to the de-
fendant is now clearly and expressly rejected. 
Zoccolillo v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 53 Utah 
39, 61, 177 Pac. 201, 210 (1918); see White v. 
Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 495, 108 P. 2d 249, 254 
( 1940) ; Williamson v. Salt Lake & 0. Ry Co., 52 
Utah 84, 90, 172 Pac. 680, 682 (1918). The bur-
den can be said to shift only in the sense that unless 
the defendant goes forward with the evidence to 
show he was not negligent, he runs the risk of the 
jury finding against him. See White v. Pinney, 99 
Utah 484, 495, 108 P. 2d 249, 254 (1940); Passey 
v. Budge, 85 Utah 37, 50, 38 P. 2d 712,718 (1934). 
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((Almost as conclusive is the case against the 
doctrine giving rise to a presumption in Utah. One 
lone decision in the past quarter-century speaks of 
res ipsa loquitur as raising a presumption of negli-
gence; see Curby v. Bennett Glass & Paint Co., 
99 Utah 80, 83, 103, P. 2d 657, 659 (1940). One 
other, decided a few months later, speaks of ((this 
inference, sometimes called a presumption." See 
White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 495, 108 P. 2d 249, 
254 (1940). & early as 1918 the court said, ((The 
principle of res ipsa Loquitur ... does not relieve 
plaintiff of the burden of proof ... or raise any 
presumption in plaintiff's favor, but simply en-
titles the jury, ... as shown by plaintiff's evidence 
to infer negligence, and to say whether, upon all the 
evidence, plaintiff has sustained his allegation." 
Williamson v. Salt Lake & 0. Ry. Co., 52 Utah 84, 
90, 172 Pac. 680, 682 ( 1918). Almost unanimously 
since this time the court has reiterated its accept-
ance of this proposition. And from the standpoint 
of logic this would seem to be the correct result, 
for to hold that the doctrine shifts the burden of 
proof, or raises a presumption which compels the 
defendant to go forward with the proof or suffer 
a directed verdict in all cases, would be to give res 
ipsa loquitur- a type of circumstantial evidence 
- greater effect than direct evidence of the same 
strength could have. 
Utah, then, is committed to the view that res 
ipsa loquitur does nothing more than justify the 
fact finder to infer negligence; it does not give rise 
to a presumption; it does not shift the burden of 
proof, although in practical effect the burden of 
going forward with the evidence is placed upon the 
defendant. In meeting this burden the defendant 
need not show that he exercised every precaution, 
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care of skill to prevent the happening of the acci-
dent; it is sufficient if he shows that he uused the 
degree of care commensurate with the dangers 
which men of prudence would have anticipated 
under the circumstances." See White v. Pinney, 
99 Utah 484, 495, 108 P. 2d 249, 254 (1940). The 
court has recognized that the inference arising 
under the rule may and will vary in strength, and 
that under some circumstances, and in the absence 
of evidence by the defendant, may be so strong 
as to compel a finding of negligence. See Jordan v. 
Coca-Cola Bottling CO. of Utah, 218 P. 2d 660, 
663 (Utah 1950); White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 
488, 108 P. 2d 249, 251 (1940); Zoccolillo v. 
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 53 Utah 39, 63, 177 
Pac. 201,211 (1918). On the other hand, an ex-
planation may be so complete and thorough as to 
bar any reasonable inference of negligence. See 
White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 488, 108 P. 2d 249, 
251 ( 1940) ; Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37, 50, 3 8 P. 
2d 712, 718 (1934); Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 
237, 2 P. 2d 257, 265 (1931); Christensen v. 
Oregon Short LineR. Co., 35 Utah 137, 146, 99 
Pac. 676, 680 (1909) ." (Footnotes inserted in the 
body of the text.) 
If we consider the evidence in this case on the basis 
of ucircumstantial evidence" we must concede that one 
thing is missing; namely, a defective condition that could 
have caused the injury. The plaintiff's lack of evidence and 
the explanation by the defendant is so complete and 
thorough as to bar any reasonable inference of negligence. 
The case of Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P. 2d 
221 (1956) aptly illustrates the point raised above. There 
a guest sought damages for personal injuries caused when 
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a corner leg of a bath tub in a hotel collapsed. In holding 
that the court should have instructed on res ipsa loquitur, 
this court reviewed the evidence: uThe bathtub in question 
was old in style containing four legs which held the bath-
tub about 4 inches from the floor. The legs were of metal 
and fit by flange and groove tapered to form a wedge 
that tightens itself as it is pushed in. A screw and screw 
insert was on the under or floor side and rear of the leg. 
The screw was to tighten the tension on the legs and pre-
vent the leg from slipping in and out. After the accident it 
was discovered that the screw was loose and the leg had 
slipped out." It was pointed out that a maid had pushed 
another leg out of its groove once or twice when cleaning 
under the tub with a mop stick and had pushed it back 
with her hand and then had reported it to the defendant, 
George R. James, who promised to fix it. The plaintiff 
also called two plumbers who testified as to their findings 
in respect to the lack of screw insert of the bathtub after 
the accident. occurred. uThe plumbers' testimony was of 
little or no help in the causation of the accident without 
directing an inference of negligence from the uhappening 
of the accident" as allowed by operation of the rule under 
discussion." This court set forth the rule as follows: 
uThe rule, when applicable, gives rise to an inference 
of negligence which carries the plaintiff's case past a non-
suit, and is applicable when: (I) The accident was of a 
kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would not 
have happened had the defendant used due care, (2) the 
instrument or thing causing the injury was at the time of 
the accident under the management and control of the 
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defendant, and ( 3) the accident happened irrespective 
of any participation at the time of the plaintiff." 
Selanie could have and did suffer injury without any 
negligence on the part of the defendant and the event 
could have and did happen regardless of the degree of care 
of the defendant. To say otherwise in the light of the evi-
dence adduced at the trial is to indulge in speculation and 
conjecture. 
2. 
THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE IS 
THAT DEFENDANT USED THE HIGHEST DEGREE 
OF CARE. 
The mere occurrence of an unusual or unexplained 
accident or injury does not warrant the application of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See Charlton v. Lovelace, 173 
S.W. 2d 13, 351 Mo. 364 (1943) where the court on page 
17 stated: 
HThe doctrine is applicable only where the 
physical cause of the injury and the attendant cir-
cumstances indicate such an unusual occurrence 
that in their very nature they carry a strong in-
herent probability of negligence and in the light 
of ordinary experience would presumably not have 
happened if those who had the management or 
control exercised proper care. Accordingly the mere 
occurrence of an unusual or unexplained accident 
or injury, if not such as necessarily to involve negli-
gence, does not warrant the application of the 
doctrine, and it has been held that the doctrine does 
not apply where the act which caused the injury 
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was beyond doubt the voluntary and intentional 
act of some person. Furthermore, the rule cannot 
be invoked where the existence of negligence is 
wholly a matter of conjecture, and the circum-
stances are not proved, but must themselves be 
presumed.' 45 J.C. p. 1211, s 778; Hart v. Emery, 
Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 233 Mo.App. 312, 
118 s.w. 2d 509, 512." 
In Dombrowskie v. Kresge-Newark, Inc., 183, A. 2d 
111, 75 N.J. Super. 271 ( 1962), the plaintiff ((described 
the movement of the escalator as slow and stated that she 
«must have gone down about three steps where it really 
starts to form into a step' when she felt (a jerk and a vibra-
tion of some sort'". The plaintiff further testified that the 
motion of the escalator caused her to fall. The court on 
page 113 stated: 
((The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not 
properly be applied to the case at bar because the 
occurrence as described by plaintiff was not one 
which in (itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence.' 
Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 
263, 269, 139 A. 2d 404, 408 (1958). 
((An escalator is a moving stairway. Its func-
tion involves motion. A (jerk' or (vibration' of such 
instrumentality while in operation, absent some 
evidence that such jerk or vibration was unusual, 
is not proof of malfunction. The record before us 
contains no evidence of malfunction." 
Conway v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 255 Mass. 571, 
152 NE 94 (1926) was an action to recover injuries to a 
six or seven year old child. The child had testified that 
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just as she reached the top of the escalator her left hand 
became caught in the moving belt which she had hold of 
and as the belt moved around the curve at the top, her 
fingers were caught between the belt and the wood under-
neath and her hand was drawn down into the slot and she 
was unable to pull her fingers out. The court on page 
94-95 stated: 
uThe doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not appli-
cable to the present case. There is no description 
of the mechanism of the escalator or what method, 
if any, might have been used to tighten the belt if it 
became loose, so that at no time could there be a 
space less than three and one-half inches deep. Nor 
was there any evidence as to how many persons 
were using the escalator at the time of the accident 
or what the strain then was upon the belt or 
whether because of such strain, the space between 
it and the wood beneath was larger than would 
ordinarily occur. Nor is there any evidence that the 
belt, when in good condition, would not wave and 
make a tslapping' noise. And there is no evidence 
of any other accidents from the alleged cause to 
charge the defendant with notice that the belt in 
question was defective. In other words, by reason 
of lack of evidence respecting the mechanism of 
the escalator, it could not properly be said that in 
the ordinary experience of mankind the accident 
would not have happened without fault of the 
defendant. Hence res ipsa loquitur has no applica-
tion." 
In Levy v. Kidde Mfg. Co., 80 A. 2d 629, 13 N.J. 
Super. 439 ( 1951), the court on page 631-32 stated: 
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ult must be immediately recognized that it 
requires more than proof of the mere occurrence of 
an accident to set the rule of res ipsa loquitur in 
operation. Does the proof presented on behalf of the 
plaintiff in the present case do more than that? 
uThe phrase res ipsa loquitur means (the thing 
itself speaks,' but what does the (thing' say"? Some-
what broadly stated, the (thing' which speaks is 
the unusual occurrence, but it must (speak' of the 
reasonable probability that the injury sustained by 
the plaintiff was in all the circumstances due to a 
dereliction of duty on the part of the defendant. 
Bahr v. Lombard, 53 N.J.L. 233, 21 A. 190, 23 A. 
167 (E.&A. 1890); Noonan v. Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Co., 104 N.J.L. 136, 139 A. 9, 56 
A.L.R. 590 (E.&A. 1927) ; Dunn v. Hoffman 
Beverage Co., 126 N.J.L. 556, 20 A. 2d 352 (E.&A. 
1941); Kramer v. R~ M. Hollingshead Corp., 5 
N.J. 386, 392, 75 A. 2d 861 (1950). 
((We must view the illustration of the present 
case as it was portrayed by the evidence offered on 
behalf of the plaintiff. The representations are that 
the syphon was well designed and constructed. It 
was in perfect condition when received by the 
merchant at some time between 1940 and 1945. 
It remained in the charge and custody of the 
merchant until May 28, 1949. But moreover, no 
defects, structural weaknesses or deficiencies in its 
manufacture were discoverable in it after the acci-
dent. When used in conformity with the accom-
panying instructions of the manufacturer it 
operated properly. 
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"Assuredly the creation of a mere opportunity 
to guess the cause of the mishap is an insufficient 
basis for the invocation of the rule." 
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit 
succinctly applied the reasoning behind the exclusion of 
the doctrine in the case of Williams v. United States, 218 
F. 2d 473 (CCA. 5th-1955). 
"In the final analysis, each case seeking to in-
voke this doctrine must stand or fall upon its own 
facts. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule based upon human 
experience and its application to a particular situa-
tion must necessarily vary with human experience. 
A situation to which the doctrine was not applicable 
a half century ago because of insufficient experi-
ence or lack of technical knowledge, might today 
fall within the scope of the rule, depending upon 
what experience has shown. The concept presup-
poses that the defendant, who had exclusive control 
of the thing causing the injury, has superior knowl-
edge or means of information to that possessed by 
the plaintiff as to the cause of the accident. It is 
not enough that the plaintiff show that the thing 
which injured him was in the exclusive control of 
the defendant, he must also show that the accident 
would not have occurred in the ordinary course 
of events if the defendant had exercised due care. 
Oftentimes experience in the particular situation is 
so uniform and well-established that it is not neces-
sary to prove this by extraneous evidence. However, 
such is not the case here. We have no knowledge, 
judicial or otherwise, of what would cause a jet 
airplane to explode in mid-air while in flight. In 
the absence, as here, of evidence showing that such 
an accident would not occur except for negligence, 
there is no basis for recovery. The trial court should 
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have granted the government's motion for judg-
ment on this ground." 
The defendant followed the established and accepted 
standard of care for escalator owners. It employed Elevator 
Service and Supply Company, specialists in the field of 
inspection, care and maintenance for such instrumentali-
ties. An inspection was made weekly, as well as within 
an hour after the accident, and no defect was found. This 
not only precludes an inference that the accident would 
not have happened had defendant used the highest degree 
of care, but it is specific, uncontroverted evidence that in 
all respects it did use such care. 
3. 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURRO·UNDING THE 
CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE WERE SUCH THAT 
THE DEFENDANT CO,ULD NOT BE REASONABLY 
EXPECTED TO· KNOW O·R BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN 
THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. 
The physical proportions of Selanie, a two and one-
half year old child, the lack of leg covering, the possible 
dampness or warmth of her leg because of the weather 
and exercise, together with the relative positioning of her 
and her leg on the escalator by her mother were as well 
known to her mother as to the defendant. If all of these 
circumstances are considered, and since no specific defect 
could be found in this case, there is no usuperior knowl-
edge" aspect on the part of the defendant upon which to 
ground the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
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In Hendershott v. Macy's, 158 Cal. App. 2d 324, 322 
P2d 596 ( 1958) the plaintiff sued for injuries suffered as a 
result of a fall on a descending escalator in a department 
store, when a package she was carrying wedged against the 
side wall of the escalator and struck her hip, causing her to 
be thrown backward on the moving steps. The Court held 
that res ipsa loquitur was not applicable, since the plaintiff 
knew as much about the cause of the accident as did the 
defendants. The Court stated on page 59 8 : 
ceRes ipsa loquitur would not apply as plaintiff 
knew as much about the cause of the accident as 
did defendants. Both plaintiff and her husband 
testified that the accident was caused by the pro-
jecting strip. As said in Billeter v. Rhodes & Jamie-
son, Ltd., 104 Cal. App. 2d 137, 147, 231 P. 2d 
93, 100: cThe doctrine is not applicable to the facts 
here involved because all the parties knew the facts 
relating to the injury. They all knew not only how 
the appellant was injured, but why he was injured 
-there was insufficient clearance between the fin 
and the cross brace. Under such circumstances the 
doctrine should not be applied * * ::- '. 
(Regardless of this apparent conflict, it is per-
fectly clear that, where the evidence of how and 
why the accident occurred is equally open and 
known to all parties, the doctrine has no a pplica-
tion. As was stated in Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 
2d 486, 490, 154 P. 2d 687, 689, 162 A.L.R. 1258, 
quoting from Wigmore on Evidence: elf the doc-
trine is to continue to serve a useful purpose, we 
should not forget that cThe particular force and 
justice of the rule, regarded as a presumption 
throwing upon the party charged the duty of pro-
ducing evidence, consists in the circumstance that 
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the chief evidence of the true cause, whether cul-
pable or innocent, is practically accessible to him 
but inaccessible to the injured person.'" 
In Kataoka v. May Dept. Stores Co., 60 Cal. App. 
2d 177, 140 P2d 467 ( 1943) while a customer in a clothing 
store was talking to a department manager near the foot 
of a descending escalator her four year old son wandered 
to the escalator and caught his right hand between the 
comb plate and the steps passing under it. The court held 
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable. 
The court on page 473-74 stated: 
uThe doctrine is likewise not applicable to 
defendant corporation, but for other reasons. cThe 
reason for the rule is that ordinarily the one injured 
is not in a position to know more than that, by some 
unusual movement of the instrumentality, he was 
injured, whereas the one who operates the instru-
mentality should know and be able to explain the 
p:recise cause of the accident.' ( 19 Cal. J ur. 7 0 5-
707; Alexander v. Wong Yick, (1938) 25 Cal. 
App. 2d 265, 269, 77 P2d 476.) elf the evidence 
affirmatively shows the operator or manager of the 
instrumentality by means of which the injuries are 
inflicted has no superior knowledge or by the exer-
cise of reasonable care is unable to secure informa-
tion regarding the cause of the accident, or the 
evidence establishes the fact that the complainant 
possesses all the knowledge or information thereof 
which is reasonably accessible to the operator of the 
machine, then the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has 
no application.' "· * * Here the evidence clearly 
establishes the immediate cause of the plaintiff's 
accident. It resulted from the facts that the escala-
tor was in operation and that it was so constructed 
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that there was an opening in which plaintiff's 
fingers could get caught. It did not result from 
anything about the operation of the escalator, such 
as the sudden jars or jolts which the operators of 
moving vehicles have been required, under this 
doctrine, to explain. Whether defendant corpora-
tion was to be held liable for the injuries thus caused 
depended on the consideration of matters which 
were as open to investigation by one party as by 
the other. * * *" 
In Stein v. Powell, 203 Va. 423, 124 S.E. 2d 889, 
( 1962) the Court on page 891 stated: 
uw e agree with the defendant that the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur has no application in this 
case. In order for the doctrine to apply in a given 
case, the instrument causing the injury must have 
been in the exclusive possession of the defendant, 
and the occurrence must have been of such a nature 
that it can be said with reasonable certainty that 
the accident would not have occurred in the absence 
of negligence on the part of the defendant. It must 
be further shown that the evidence of the cause of 
the accident is accessible to the defendant and in-
accessible to the injured party. Beer Distributors, 
Inc. v. Winfree, 190 Va. 521, 57 S.E. 2d 902." 
This is also the case where the evidence surrounding 
the occurrence has been introduced and submitted to the 
jury and where the cause of the accident is known. Under 
such circumstances there can be no application of the 
doctrine. 
In Day v. National U. S. Radiator Corporation, 241 
La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 ( 1961), the Court stated on page 
665: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
((This doctrine [res ipsa loquitur] is a qualifi-
cation of the general rule that negligence is not to 
be presumed but must always be affirmatively 
proved, and therefore should be sparingly applied, 
and only in exceptional cases where the demands 
of justice make that application essential. See Se-
curity Insurance Company v. Omaha Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 157 Neb. 923, 62 N.W. 2d 127; 
Nopson v. City of Seattle, 33 Wash. 2d 772, 207 
P. 2d 674; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 220, p. 1031. 
((The following is found in 38 Am. ]ur. 999, 
sec. 3 0 3, Negligence: 
((The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no appli-
cation where all the facts and circumstances ap-
pear in evidence. Nothing is then left to inference 
and the necessity for the doctrine does not exist. 
Being a rule of necessity, it must be invoked only 
where evidence is absent and not readily available. 
It is not to be invoked when the evidence is avail-
able, and certainly not when it is actually presented. 
Nor has it any application where the cause of the 
accident is known and is not in question.' 
((On this point, see also Res Ipsa Loquitur-
Availability, 33 A.L.R. 2d 791,793; Prosser, Hand-
book on the Law of Torts, p. 214 (1955). 
((In Southwestern Gas & Electric Co. v. Des-
hazo, 199 Ark. 1078, 138 S.W. 2d 397, the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas refus·ed to use the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur in deciding the case before it and 
said in explanation that it was committed to the 
theory that the doctrine cannot be availed of where 
there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of 
the accident and all the facts and circumstances 
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attendant upon the occurrence clearly appear. In 
such a case, the court stated, nothing is left to in-
ference and no presumption can be indulged. 
* * * 
uAlthough the plaintiff was justified in rely-
ing on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in her pe-
tition in this case because she was ignorant of the 
cause of the boiler explosion which killed her hus-
band, under the above authorities the doctrine 
should not be used by this court in deciding the 
suit, nor should it have been relied on by the Court 
of Appeal or by the district court in finding for 
petitioner. As shown by the authorities, its applica-
bility is to be determined at the conclusion of the 
trial. In the instant case all the facts and circum-
stances leading to the explosion of the boiler are 
in evidence, the cause of the explosion has been fully 
established by the evidence and nothing is left to 
inference." 
In Johnson v. West Fargo Manufacturing Company, 
95 NW 2d 497, 502 the court said: 
uThe next point raised by the defendant is 
that the court erred in instructing the jury on the 
theory of res ipsa loquitur. The trial court instruct-
ed the jury in conformity with our established defi-
nition of res ipsa loquitur as set forth in Johnson v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 235 Minn. 471, 51 N.W. 
2d 573. This instruction was correct as an abstract 
proposition of law. In general the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence 
from the circumstances of an accident. It is prop-
erly applied where the defendant is in control of 
the situation or instrumentality and the fact of the 
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accident shows that someone has been negligent. 
However, it is well established that the doctrine 
has no application where all of the facts and cir-
cumstances appear in evidence, nor has it any appli-
cation where the cause of the accident is known and 
is not in question. 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, 303; 
Heffter v. Northern States Power Co., 173 Minn. 
215, 217, 217 N.W. 102, 103; Klingman v. Loew's 
Inc., 209 Minn. 449, 296 N.W. 528; Cullen v. 
Pearson, 191 Minn. 136, 253 N.W. 117, 254 N.W. 
631; Anderson v. Eastern Minnesota Power Co., 
197 Minn. 144, 266 N.W. 702; Johnson v. Bosch, 
178 Minn. 363, 227 N.W. 181. In the case before 
us the evidence fully discloses the facts constitut-
ing the alleged negligence which resulted in the 
fatal injury. The accident resulted because the stop 
hooks, which were made of I/ 4-inch hot rolled 
steel, were too weak to support the auger tube and 
therefore gave way allowing the auger arms to 
collap:se. Under the circumstances there is nothing 
left to inference. The cause of the accident is 
known and not in question." See also Levy v. D.C. 
Transit System, Inc., 174 A 2d 731 ( 1961). 
II. 
THE COURT SHO·ULD NO'T HAVE DISMISSED 
THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT OF THE DE-
FENDANT J. C. PENNEY COMPANY AGAINST 
ELEVA TOR SERVICE AND SUPPLY COMPANY. 
The defendant employed Elevator Service and Supply 
Company to inspect, care for and maintain its escalators. 
This was necessary and in keeping with the duty imposed 
by the court on the defendant of the highest degree of 
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care. If Elevator Service and Supply Company was negli-
gent, such negligence was not a defense for the defendant 
for the court also held that the duty of this defendant 
was non-delegible. Under all the facts and circumstances 
of this case, if the verdict is allowed to stand, the re-
sponsibility must be that of Elevator Service and Supply 
Company and not J. C. Penney Company. The only per-
son or persons who could have known or should have 
known of any defect, deviation, circumstance or con-
dition which could have caused the injury was Elevator 
Service and Supply Company, and any act or omission 
upon which a verdict could be grounded was its alone. 
If this judgment is affirmed the court should reverse 
the ruling of the trial court dismissing the third party 
complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury having specifically found no defect to 
exist the court erred in submitting the case to the jury on 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. First, it did not appear 
that the injury resulted from some act or omission incident 
to the defendant's management of the escalator. Second, 
the incident was not one of such a nature as does not 
happen in the ordinary course of things and where defend-
ant used the highest degree of care. Third, the circum-
stance surrounding the causing of the occurrence were 
such that the defendant could not reasonably be expected 
to know what the cause was and be able to explain the 
cause of the incident. 
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All of the above three conditions are required to give 
rise to an inference that the defendant was negligent. 
The evidence adduced by both plaintiff and defendant 
completely negatives such as a matter of law. To hold 
otherwise is to make the owner and operator of an escalator 
an insurer of the safety of the passengers. 
The evidence cannot give rise to an inference under 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine where all of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the accident and in any way 
relating to any possible defect, act or omission have been 
specifically presented to the jury. 
If any negligence by inference is allowed the defend-
ant Elevator Service and Supply Company is solely re-
sponsible therefore. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
MERLIN 0. BAKER 
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